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RESPONSE

ACCESS TO COUNSEL, RES JUDICATA,
AND THE FUTURE OF HABEAS AT GUANTANAMO

STEPHEN I. VLADECK†
In response to Andrew Kent, Essay, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?,
161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 20 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/
essays/10-2012/Kent.pdf.
INTRODUCTION
As Professor Andrew Kent explains, the recent litigation over whether
noncitizens detained at Guantanamo have a continuing right of access to
counsel once their habeas petitions have been denied or dismissed is just the
tip of the iceberg.1 These cases raise a host of challenging questions about
not only the rules governing the Guantanamo detainee litigation or the
future of U.S. detention policy, but also the nature of the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause2 more generally.3 Professor Kent’s analysis provides
†

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington
College of Law. Although I served as co-counsel on an amicus brief in support of the petitioner in
Boumediene, the views expressed herein are mine alone.
1 See Andrew Kent, Essay, Do Boumediene Rights Expire?, 161 U. PA . L. REV. PENNUMBRA
20, 20 (2012), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/10-2012/Kent.pdf.
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
3 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 S ETON HALL L.
REV. 1451 (2011) (summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence in Guantanamo habeas cases
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008), which
held that the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo).
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useful insight on these complex issues, especially his recognition of the
significance of Chief Judge Lamberth’s September 2012 decision reaffirming
that the government cannot interfere with Guantanamo detainees’ access to
counsel, even for those who have already had their day in court.4
But inasmuch as Professor Kent’s essay suggests that the recent contretemps provoking Judge Lamberth’s ruling present the larger question of
whether “Boumediene rights expire,”5 I argue in this Response that this is, in
fact, not the real question implicated by the current Guantanamo litigation.
As I explain in Part I, if Boumediene was rightly decided, it must necessarily
follow that the federal courts have jurisdiction not only to entertain habeas
petitions, but also to protect that jurisdiction by policing the ability of
detainees to file future petitions. And, whereas Congress and the Supreme
Court have imposed some limits on the relitigation of substantive claims in
post-conviction habeas cases, Part II suggests why, contra Professor Kent,
res judicata categorically does not apply in the context of challenges to
executive detention. Instead, the important questions going forward (to
which I turn in Parts III and IV) will focus on the merits of potential
successive habeas claims, including whether the government’s detention
authority might wane over time, and whether detainees’ rights under
domestic and international law will become more salient as time goes on.
I. WHY BOUMEDIENE “RIGHTS” CANNOT “EXPIRE”
Professor Kent’s essay begins with the proposition that in Boumediene,
the Supreme Court recognized a new “right” to habeas corpus for at least
some noncitizens detained outside the territorial United States.6 In fact,
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was careful not to couch its holding in
terms of individual rights.7 Instead, the Court focused on the separation
of powers, holding only that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause “has
full effect” at Guantanamo.8 Thus, the federal courts must be open to hear
4 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL
4039707, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding “that petitioners have an ongoing right to access
the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel”); Kent, supra note 1, at 32-33 (discussing the
Obama Administration’s curious litigation position on the access-to-counsel issue).
5 See Kent, supra note 1, at 21.
6 See Kent, supra note 1, at 20-21.
7 Virtually all of the Boumediene majority’s references to “rights” are to the claims detainees
might vindicate through their habeas petitions. See, e.g., 553 U.S. at 743, 745 (describing the
Suspension Clause as an “instrument,” “means,” or “device” to protect “individual libert[ies]” and
“the rights of the detained”).
8 Id. at 771.
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the detainees’ challenges to the lawfulness of their detention, whether
via habeas corpus or an adequate alternative.9 Quite pointedly, the
Boumediene majority did not go on to hold that noncitizens detained at
Guantanamo actually have any constitutional rights that might bear on
the merits of their habeas petitions; it held only that the courts must be
open to whatever legal challenges the detainees could raise.10
This distinction, which Professor Kent and I have debated before,11 is
hardly semantic. After all, the question raised in a habeas petition is not
just whether the challenged detention violates the petitioner’s rights; it
is whether the detention is lawful—a question that turns as much on the
government’s underlying authority to detain as it does on any individual
right not to be detained.12 In the post-conviction habeas context more
familiar to legal practitioners, a detainee typically uses habeas to collaterally challenge his underlying conviction or sentence. As such, the
distinction between government authority and individual rights will
often collapse, since the conviction and sentence are the sources of the
government’s ongoing detention authority. Thus, so long as neither the
conviction nor the sentence is constitutionally infirm, post-conviction
habeas relief will generally (albeit not always) be unavailable.13 But in
9 For more on the separation-of-powers theme of Justice Kennedy’s analysis, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2107, 2109 (2009).
10 See, e.g., 553 U.S. at 795 (“Our decision today holds only that petitioners before us are
entitled to seek the writ of [habeas corpus].”).
11 Compare, e.g., Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the
Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 103 (2011) (asserting that in Boumediene, the Supreme Court
embraced “global constitutionalism” by extending the Constitution’s substantive protections to
non-citizens overseas), and Andrew Kent, Habeas Corpus, Protection, and Extraterritorial Constitutional Rights: A Reply to Stephen Vladeck’s “Insular Thinking About Habeas”, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL .
34, 35-36 (2012), http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_97_Kent.pdf (same), with Stephen I.
Vladeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL . 16, 18-19 (2012),
http://www.uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_97_Vladeck.pdf (arguing that Professor Kent’s reading
of Boumediene is belied by both the language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion and its subsequent
application in the lower courts).
12 See generally Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, 1181
(arguing that “habeas relief can be based on individual-rights claims” but that these claims can also
be based on the illegality of the detention itself).
13 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-02 (1993) (explaining that habeas claims
challenge the constitutionality of a conviction, not its correctness, and that even when a conviction
was arguably wrong, it cannot be overturned through habeas). But see id. at 437 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there should be no bar to the assertion of an actual innocence claim in a
habeas petition because “it violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to execute a person
who is actually innocent”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963) (“The jurisdictional
prerequisite [in habeas cases] is not the judgment of a state court but detention
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the executive-detention context, almost every case brought both before
and after September 11 has involved a claim that the government lacked
the authority to detain, not that the otherwise valid detention was in
violation of the detainee’s individual rights.14 As these cases demonstrate, habeas can still be tremendously effective even for detainees who
cannot specifically invoke any individual “rights.”
This formulation matters because it helps to undercut the idea that
the right to challenge continued physical detention ever “expires.” Even
if the initial detention is lawful, circumstances may change in a manner
that materially affects the legality of the continuing detention; so long
as an individual remains in custody, the Constitution protects his ability
to challenge that custody in court. And although this result usually
follows from the federal habeas statutes,15 Boumediene necessarily compels the same conclusion, even in cases in which Congress has withdrawn the statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts (so long as the
Suspension Clause applies).
II. HABEAS CORPUS AND RES JUDICATA
The above discussion explains why Chief Judge Lamberth was correct to hold that the federal courts continue to retain jurisdiction over
current and future habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees.16
The harder question, at least superficially, is whether the litigation of a
detainee’s initial habeas petition is in any way preclusive of his ability to
bring a second or successive claim, and thus, whether jurisdiction in
these cases is an empty formalism to preserve claims that are patently
unavailing on their face.

simpliciter. . . . Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right is denied and
a person confined, the federal court has the power to release him.”).
14 But see, e.g., Al Warafi v. Obama, 409 F. App’x 360, 361 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(remanding a detainee’s habeas petition for consideration of his claim that his detention is
foreclosed by his rights as a medic under Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention).
15 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006) (authorizing habeas relief for detainees who are “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).
16 See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL
4039707, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012) (“In the case of Guantanamo detainees, access to the
courts means nothing without access to counsel. And it is undisputed that petitioners here have a
continuing right to seek habeas relief. It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to access
the courts and, necessarily, to consult with counsel.”).
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As Professor Kent rightly concedes, at common law, res judicata did not
apply to habeas claims.17 Writing for the Court in Sanders v. United States,
Justice Brennan explained that
[i]t has been suggested that this principle derives from the fact that at
common law habeas corpus judgments were not appealable. But its roots
would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of litigation have
no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged. . . . The inapplicability of res judicata to habeas, then, is
inherent in the very role and function of the writ.18

To that end, even after Congress invested the federal circuit courts
with appellate jurisdiction in habeas cases in the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867,19 the Court continued to hold that res judicata generally did not
preclude relitigation on the merits in habeas petitions of claims that
were litigated in the underlying criminal trial (or in a prior habeas
petition).20 Although the Justices did adopt judge-made constraints on
relitigation deemed abusive, the basis for such an “abuse of the writ”
doctrine was the petitioner’s misconduct and deliberate manipulation of
the judicial system, not the preclusive nature of the original adjudication
on the merits.21 To that end, the Court in Sanders itself held that the
then-extant version of 28 U.S.C. § 2244—which appeared to incorporate res judicata into the post-conviction context—did not actually do
so.22 Rather, the Sanders Court concluded that the statute “permitted,”
but did “not compel[]” district judges to refuse to entertain second or
successive habeas petitions23 so long as “the petition present[ed] no new
ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or
court [wa]s satisfied that the ends of justice will not be served by such
17 See Kent, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Steve Vladeck, Habeas, Res Judicata, and Why the New
Guantanamo MOU is a Big Deal, LAWFARE (July 17, 2012, 5:13 PM), http://lawfareblog.com/
2012/07/habeas-res-judicata-and-why-the-new-guantanamo-mou-is-a-big-deal).
18 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (internal citations omitted).
19 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
20 See, e.g., Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924) (stating that the rule that res judicata does not
bar relitigation through a writ of habeas corpus of previously resolved merits claims is “well established”).
21 See, e.g., Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239, 241 (1924) (holding that the plaintiff
abused the writ of habeas corpus by failing to present evidence at trial so he could present it in a later
petition); see also Ex parte Cuddy, 40 F. 62, 65-66 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1889) (”[W]hile the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply, it is held that the officers before whom the second application is made may
take into consideration the fact that a previous application had been made to another officer and
refused; and in some instances that fact may justify a refusal of the second.”).
22 Sanders, 373 U.S. at 11-12.
23 Id. at 12.
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inquiry.” 24 Pointedly, the Sanders Court construed § 2244 to avoid the
“serious constitutional questions” that the statute would have raised
had it been interpreted to otherwise codify res judicata and thereby
“derogate from the traditional liberality of the writ.”25
To be sure, when Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 26 it came closer to incorporating
res judicata into post-conviction habeas litigation by both requiring
federal courts to defer to most state court legal rulings on the merits, 27
and imposing far tighter restrictions on the ability of those in custody
pursuant to state court convictions to bring second or successive
challenges to their conviction via habeas. 28 But neither of these
measures expressly incorporated res judicata into the post-conviction
context, and even still, the Supreme Court was careful to interpret
these provisions to preserve at least some availability of continuing
habeas relief in order to avoid constitutional questions.29
Nevertheless, Professor Kent suggests that the federal courts
“would not seem to be foreclosed by the Boumediene decision or any
strong policy arguments” from applying res judicata (or at least the
abuse-of-the-writ doctrine) to Guantanamo detainees’ habeas claims. 30
In fact, the Boumediene Court was at pains to emphasize the fundamental differences between Congress’s power to circumscribe the scope of
habeas review of state court convictions and its comparable power visà-vis federal executive detention. As Justice Kennedy put it,

24
25
26
27

Id. at 11 n.5 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244).
Id. at 11-12.
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. code).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (stating that the federal court should not grant a writ of
habeas corpus with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless
the decision by the state court “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”); see also
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (interpreting § 2254(d)(1) to authorize habeas
relief only if the state court (1) “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a
question of law;” (2) “decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts;” or (3) “identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case”).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (stating that a habeas petition raising an already-litigated issue
“need not be entertained” by a federal court).
29 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1996) (holding that the Court’s ability to
entertain “original” habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) vitiated any constitutional
question that AEDPA’s constraints on second or successive habeas petitions might otherwise have
raised regarding the Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
30 Kent, supra note 1, at 30.

11 Vladeck.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2012 9:53 AM

84

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

[Vol. 161: 78

[w]here a person is detained by executive order, rather than, say, after being
tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. A criminal conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing
before a tribunal disinterested in the outcome and committed to procedures
designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics are not inherent
in executive detention orders or executive review procedures. In this
context the need for habeas corpus is more urgent. The intended duration
of the detention and the reasons for it bear upon the precise scope of the
inquiry. Habeas corpus proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial, even
when the detention is by executive order. But the writ must be effective.
The habeas court must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful
review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.31

This contrast, between post-conviction habeas petitions and habeas petitions seeking review of executive detention, should be only that much more
relevant with regard to the preclusive effect of the initial habeas proceeding.
After all, detention in the post-conviction context is for a finite period,
usually determined at the time of conviction, and the overwhelming
majority of claims for post-conviction relief contest the underlying validity
of the conviction (or sentence) itself. In that context, it is less likely that the
resolution of the same claim will differ based upon when—or how often—it
is relitigated. In contrast, in the context of executive and other noncriminal
detention, the length of detention is not fixed ab initio, and the same source
of detention authority may, in fact, apply differently as time goes on.
Consider in this regard the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning
the constitutional limits on noncriminal detention, whether civil commitment,32 pre-trial confinement,33 or detention of noncitizens facing deportation.34 In each of these contexts, the Court has held that due process
requires both an individualized showing of current and future dangerousness35

31
32

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008).
See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-69 (1997) (examining the constitutionality of involuntary confinement for those who are “dangerous or mentally impaired”).
33 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (reviewing the constitutionality of
pre-trial confinement for arrestees who “pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the
community which no condition of release can dispel”).
34 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (discussing the constitutionality of predeportation confinement of noncitizens).
35 Id. at 690-91 (explaining that the Court has “upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals” (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
368; and Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747, 750-52)).
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and a period of detention that is limited to a “reasonable” duration.36 As
such, one could easily imagine a scenario where the exact same claim—that
a noncriminal detainee’s continuing incapacitation is unlawful—might have
a different answer at different times.
This is all a long way of saying what should have already been clear before Boumediene: whatever limits Congress and the Court may have recognized on second or successive habeas petitions in the post-conviction
context, it is much harder to justify those limits on either legal or policy
grounds in the context of ongoing executive detention. Indeed, precluding
those who have a nonfrivolous basis on which to relitigate a previously
unsuccessful challenge to their ongoing, noncriminal detention raises the same
“serious constitutional questions” to which Justice Brennan alluded in Sanders.37
III. THE POTENTIAL M ERITS OF S ECOND OR SUCCESSIVE
GUANTANAMO HABEAS PETITIONS
Of course, if the justification for allowing this kind of potentially openended relitigation is the idea that the merits of a detainee’s challenge to his
continuing, noncriminal detention might change, then the real question
raised by the Guantanamo cases going forward is whether noncitizens whose
habeas petitions have already been dismissed or denied might ever be able to
raise viable challenges to their continuing detention. What little the Supreme
Court has said on the matter suggests that the answer will typically be no.
For example, in Ludecke v. Watkins, the Court held that the Alien Enemy
Act of 1798—which authorizes the President to detain noncitizen adults
present in the country who are “natives, citizens, denizens or subjects” of a
country at war with the United States38—continued to authorize the
detention of German nationals by the United States in 1948, more than
three years after Germany’s unconditional surrender ended World War II
in Europe.39 Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Frankfurter explained that
36 In some circumstances, the Court has expressly quantified what a reasonable duration
would be. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (holding that, absent special circumstances, the Due
Process Clause forbids the government from detaining a noncitizen for longer than six months
while his or her deportation is pending without a significant likelihood that the noncitizen will be
deported in the foreseeable future).
37 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 12 (1963); see also supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
38 An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006)).
39 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166-69, 171-73 (1948) (reasoning that a cease-fire does
not allow the courts to declare that hostilities have terminated, and holding that the Alien Enemy
Act validly delegated such a determination to the President).
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the question of when a war was over was reserved for the political branches
regardless of what was true on the ground.40 Thus, the petitioners would
not be entitled to habeas relief unless they were detained after the cessation
of hostilities had been formally declared by the political branches.41 Ludecke
may therefore suggest that noncitizens who have had their day in court
according to Boumediene will not have a viable challenge to their continuing
detention until the political branches formally recognize a cessation of the
hostilities initiated by Congress’s September 2001 Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (AUMF).42 Especially in light of the AUMF’s
reaffirmation in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (NDAA),43 it seems unlikely the political branches will declare an end
to these hostilities anytime soon.44
At the same time, there is at least some language in the Supreme
Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld hinting that this issue may not
be so clearly settled.45 There, the Court agreed with the petitioner—a U.S.
citizen captured in Afghanistan—that the AUMF did not authorize “indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation.”46 Moreover, the Court
interpreted the scope of the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force”
provision, from which it derived the government’s detention authority,
according to law-of-war principles.47 Because American soldiers were still
40
41

See id. at 166 & n.10, 170.
See id. at 168-69 & n. 13; see also United States ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348
(1952) (per curiam) (holding that the Attorney General’s power to remove the petitioner under
the Alien Enemy Act expired when Congress officially ended the war with Germany).
42 See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note) (authorizing the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against” those who “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the September 11 attacks).
43 See Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (authorizing the detention of
those responsible for September 11 as well as those who “substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners”).
44 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War Without
End, 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 53, 53 (2006) (discussing the possibility that the “‘war’ on
terrorism may never end” and the legal ramifications of such an enduring conflict). But see Charlie
Savage, Pentagon Counsel Speaks of Post-Qaeda Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/us/politics/pentagon-counsel-looks-ahead-to-post-qaeda-legalchallenges.html (quoting a speech by Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson in which he
suggested that we may soon reach “a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of
Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured and the group is no longer able to attempt or
launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that Al Qaeda as we know it, the organization
that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed,” thereby
raising difficult questions concerning the government’s continuing detention authority).
45 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
46 Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
47 See id.
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involved in “[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban fighters,” those
principles necessarily supported the conclusion that “necessary and appropriate force” included the power to detain those captured on the battlefield.48
That said, Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, sounded an important
note of caution. In her words, “If the practical circumstances of a given
conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the
development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is
not the situation we face as of this date.”49
In light of this discussion in Hamdi, one might argue that, if there comes
a point when no ground troops are involved in “active combat operations”
in Afghanistan (or elsewhere), then the detention authority provided by the
AUMF may expire, even without a formal announcement to that effect by
the political branches.50 At the very least, this argument is far from frivolous.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE D ETAINEES’
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL
Another possibility is that, as it has with other forms of noncriminal
detention, the courts will eventually hold that the Due Process Clause
places limits on the type and length of detentions that are otherwise lawful.
The D.C. Circuit has already held, after Boumediene, that the Due Process
Clause does not apply at Guantanamo.51 But a host of commentators

48
49
50

See id.
Id.
This argument is bolstered by the fact that the detention authority conferred by the
AUMF (and the NDAA), unlike the Alien Enemy Act, is directly tethered to the laws of war,
which authorize only the detention of enemy combatants until the cessation of an “armed
conflict.” See id.; Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws
of War—Part II, LAWFARE (Dec. 31, 2011, 4:48 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/
the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-part-ii (“[T]he detention authority conferred by
the AUMF, as ‘affirmed’ by the NDAA, must be understood with reference to the laws of war.
Importantly, this construction should govern not only habeas cases going forward, but also the
detention practices of future administrations.”); see also United States v. Hamdan, 696 F.3d 1238,
1248 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (underscoring the significance of statutes that “explicitly incorporate[]
international norms into domestic U.S. law”).
51 See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that
the Due Process Clause does not apply to noncitizens abroad), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235, 1235
(2010) (per curiam) (holding that new developments regarding offers to detainees to resettle in
other countries required rehearing in the lower court), reinstated on remand, (Kiyemba III), 605
F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding that the new developments did not affect
the proper outcome of the case), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
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(including me) have strongly criticized the D.C. Circuit’s decision,52 and a
number of subsequent decisions in Guantanamo cases have implied that
the Due Process Clause could apply.53 Especially as military commissions
begin issuing decisions on the merits,54 it seems likely that the due process
question will be revisited given the fundamentally different interests
implicated in criminal, as opposed to civil, proceedings.55 As such, it is
more than possible that federal courts will recognize at least some constitutional protections for the Guantanamo detainees, whether under the
Due Process Clause or other provisions.
This is where Chief Judge Lamberth’s opinion settling the access-tocounsel dispute becomes so intriguing.56 The government precipitated the
decision by requiring at least some counsel, notably those whose detainee
clients’ habeas petitions had been dismissed or denied, to sign a new “Memorandum of Understanding” (MOU).57 This document imposed far stricter
limits on their ability to meet (and communicate) with their clients.58 It also
limited their ability to challenge the terms of the MOU, ostensibly on the
ground that such contacts became less significant once the individual detainee

52 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 972
(2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: F ROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE
(2010)) (explaining the extent to which the court in Kiyemba I failed to appreciate the broad
historical scope of a habeas court’s equitable powers).
53 See, e.g., Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that even if
the petitioner had a constitutional right to due process and the district court violated it by relying on
evidence outside of record, such error would be harmless); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d
509, 518 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (assuming that Guantanamo detainees
have the same constitutional rights with respect to their proposed transfer as did U.S. citizens in a
previous case); cf. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 278 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Baker, C.J., concurring in
part and concurring in the result) (explaining how Boumediene alters the analysis courts should use in
determining the extraterritorial scope of constitutional rights and that “law overseas should not be
applied in a formalistic manner, but in a practical and contextual manner”).
54 See, e.g., United States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1323 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev.
2011) (upholding a military commission’s verdict that the defendant provided material support to
terrorism and approving the sentence), rev’d, 696 F.3d at 1249-52 (reversing the conviction
because “material support to terrorism” was not recognized as a violation of the international laws
of war at the time of the defendant’s relevant conduct).
55 Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (arguing
that the process that is due should vary as between criminal fines, criminal convictions resulting in
prison terms, and capital cases).
56 In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 WL
4039707 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012).
57 See Benjamin Wittes, A New Battle Over GTMO Attorney Access, LAWFARE (July 11, 2012,
4:22 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/7995 (reporting on the government’s insistence
that lawyers for detainees sign a “highly-restrictive memorandum of understanding”).
58 Id.
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had received his day in court.59 The lawyers objected, arguing that the MOU
interfered with their clients’ right of access to counsel, and thus, with their
right of access to the courts.60 Chief Judge Lamberth agreed:
The Court has an obligation to assure that those seeking to challenge their
Executive detention by petitioning for habeas relief have adequate, effective
and meaningful access to the courts. In the case of Guantanamo detainees,
access to the courts means nothing without access to counsel. And it is undisputed that petitioners here have a continuing right to seek habeas relief.
It follows that petitioners have an ongoing right to access the courts and,
necessarily, to consult with counsel. . . . The Court, whose duty it is to
secure an individual’s liberty from unauthorized and illegal Executive confinement, cannot now tell a prisoner that he must beg leave of the Executive’s grace before the Court will involve itself. This very notion offends
separation-of-powers principles and our constitutional scheme.61

What is most revealing about this analysis is Chief Judge Lamberth’s underexplained assumption that detainees’ right of access to counsel follows from
their right of access to the courts. Shortly after the Supreme Court’s 2004
decision in Rasul v. Bush that federal courts had statutory jurisdiction to hear
habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees,62 the D.C. district court recognized the detainees’ right of access to counsel, but only under the federal habeas
statute.63 No court has revisited the question since Congress overruled Rasul and
revoked most federal courts’ statutory jurisdiction over Guantanamo in the
Detainee Treatment Act of 200564 and the Military Commissions Act of
2006.65 But, one may well argue that the right of access to counsel is simply
part and parcel of the individual’s right to a “meaningful” opportunity to
challenge the legality of his detention, which is what the Supreme Court held

59 Memorandum of Understanding Governing Continued Contact Between Counsel/
Translator and Detainee Following Termination of the Detainee’s Habeas Case no. 8(f) (n.d.),
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Post-Habeas-MOU.pdf.
60 See Wittes, supra note 57.
61 In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, 2012 WL 4039707, at *18.
62 See 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004).
63 See Al Odah v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that 28
U.S.C. § 2254, when read together with 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2), “provides this Court with the
discretionary authority to have counsel represent Petitioners in the habeas context”).
64 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 274144 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)).
65 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 263536 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
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the Suspension Clause to require in Boumediene.66 So construed, access to
counsel would be necessary to vindicate the Boumediene Court’s understanding
of the Suspension Clause and would therefore follow from the Court’s holding
that the Suspension Clause “has full effect” at Guantanamo.67 If so, this would
be an important development, albeit one limited to habeas cases.
In every other context, however, the Supreme Court has assessed a litigant’s right of access to counsel according to traditional due process analysis,68 presumably because such a right both transcends challenges to ongoing
physical confinement and is more comfortably understood as an individual
right than as a structural protection. Because the purpose of access to
counsel is to allow litigants to avail themselves of subsequent legal process
regardless of the nature of their underlying claim, it appears at once to be
both procedural and individual. As Justice Stevens put it, “Access to counsel
for the purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.”69 And so, unless the right of
access to counsel could be traced simultaneously (or independently) to both
the Due Process Clause and the Suspension Clause,70 the real significance of
Chief Judge Lamberth’s analysis may be the implicit but necessary conclusion that the detainees do have at least a modicum of due process rights. If
such a conclusion is given fuller explication, it would introduce new
grounds pursuant to which Guantanamo detainees—and others in similar
situations—might seek to relitigate their underlying detention claims.
Either way, Chief Judge Lamberth’s opinion suggests that there is far
more work to be done in fleshing out the full extent of the Constitution’s
applicability in the Guantanamo cases.
66 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (“[T]he privilege of habeas corpus entitles
the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous
application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))).
67 Id. at 771. For a much fuller explication of this argument and of the otherwise underappreciated relationship between Boumediene and the Supreme Court’s access-to-courts jurisprudence,
see generally Vladeck, supra note 9.
68 See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332-34 (1985) (summarizing cases in which the Court has recognized a litigant’s right to—or right of access to—counsel).
69 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 There is a complex relationship between the Due Process Clause and the Suspension
Clause. See Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the
Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14
U. PA . J. CONST. L. 719, 776 (2012) (concluding that the Court’s interpretation of the relationship between the two clauses will hinge on whether the Court applies Boumediene’s “impracticable
and anomalous” test or instead uses the separation-of-powers approach); Martin H. Redish &
Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA . L. REV. 1361, 1375-87 (2010) (examining the limits that
the Due Process Clause imposes on the Suspension Clause).
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It is tempting to think that none of this would matter if President
Obama had fulfilled his pledge to close Guantanamo71 or that the issues
raised by Professor Kent’s Essay are simply legacy problems confined to a
small, unique, and eventually vanishing class of cases. But so long as the
government continues to claim the power to subject certain terrorism
suspects to long-term military detention under the laws of war, the question
of whether (and to what extent) such detainees are entitled to continuing
judicial review will matter, even if they are imprisoned at locations other
than Guantanamo.72 As I suggested above, Chief Judge Lamberth was
clearly correct that, in cases in which the Suspension Clause “has full
effect,” the federal courts have continuing jurisdiction to supervise executive
detentions. In this context, the Suspension Clause gives the federal courts the
power to protect the detainees’ right of access to counsel to facilitate the
filing of future claims, even for those detainees seeking to relitigate prior
challenges to the same detention. Whether or not such access will make any
difference going forward depends entirely on whether the government’s
detention authority wanes—or whether the detainees’ claims under domestic or international law ripen—over time.
It is to these queries, and not to the question of whether “Boumediene
rights expire,” that we should direct our focus.
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71 See William Glaberson & Helene Cooper, Obama’s Plan to Close Prison at Guantánamo May
Take Year, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A1.
72 See, e.g., Maqaleh v. Gates, Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307 & 08-2143, 2012 WL 5077483, at *12
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2012) (holding that noncitizens detained at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan are
not entitled to pursue habeas relief, even where the detainees were neither arrested in, nor citizens
of, Afghanistan).

